The stardom system characterizes creative industries: the demand and revenues are concentrated on a few bestselling books, movies or music. In this paper, we study the demand structure between bestsellers and new artists' productions in the music industry. We set up an experiment where participants face real choices situations. We create three treatments to isolate the effect of information and incentives on diversity. In a first treatment, music is consumed for free without information. In a second one, subjects receive a prior information on others' evaluation of songs to study the effect of word-of-mouth. Finally, in a third one, a real market is introduced and music is bought. Significant evidence shows that word-of-mouth lowers diversity, while price incentives tend to lift it. In both treatments, subjects also react to the information or incentives nature.
Introduction
The structure of the creative industry is generally described as being shaped according to the 80/20 Pareto law: 80% of the total revenue is made by 20% of the supply. This stardom economy can be understood in terms of differentiation of talents (Rosen, 1981) or by the fact that cultural consumption requires knowledge and information (Adler, 1985) . As cultural goods are experience goods (Nelson 1970) , they are characterized by an exacerbated uncertainty. Mimicry can lead to lower search costs and this is why the demand concentrates on a restrained number of productions. It can also be that consumers benefit from network effects when imitating others' consumption. Because of the stardom economy, it can be really hard for a new artist to enter the market. According to Adler (2006) , "consumers prefer the most popular artist and therefore even an artist who is as talented as the star cannot entice audiences away from the star, not even by offering a lower price". In other words, price incentives do not outweigh the prior advantage of settled artists.
In the supply side, because "nobody knows" (Caves, 2000) which production will lead the stardom system, firms bet on a small sample of artists and invest on large promotion
campaigns to enhance what is called "informational cascades" (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992, Banerjee, 1992) . With the digitalization of the industry, Anderson (2004) Consumers are looking for novelty because cultural goods are semi-durable goods (Bianchi, 2002) . According to a IFOP sondage (Institut Français d'Opinion Publique, French Institute of Public Opinion) in 2014, 72% of the young radio listeners (15/34 years old) think that radio channels broadcast the same songs too often and that the music programming is not enough diversified. The arousal and satisfaction derived from the consumption of a piece of music varies over time and exposure: the taste for a specific musical song often increases 2 Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2015.27 with exposure and then decreases through over-exposure (Hunter and Schellenberg, 2011) 1 .
But, because it can be costly or risky to try new artists, novelty-seeking behavior might not be enough to counterbalance the stardom structure of the market.
In terms of public policies, it is crucial to promote creative innovation. A deterioration of cultural diversity may lead to a decrease in the demand (Benhamou, 2002) . In France, radio channels have the obligation of broadcasting 40% of its songs in French, half of which has to be new in order to compensate for the stardom structure of the music industry. Exposure to new entrants can facilitate the demand for novelty since it eliminates uncertainty about its quality.
In this paper, we study the effect of information and monetary incentives on the distribution of sales (concentration versus diversity) between bestsellers and new artists in the music market. According to the literature, word-of-mouth between consumers should concentrate the demand on artists that are already settled. Regarding prices, there are no important differentiation in the physical nor digital music market (Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2003) . Still, in the concert market, prices are differentiated and artist-related characteristics explains the level of prices: the career and the popularity of an artist explain higher concert prices (Decrop and Derbaix, 2014) Salganik, Dodds and Watts (2006) found that observing other individuals' behavior actually increases the skewness of the distribution of the demand. Experimental methods can be used to isolate the effect of peers' information (word-of-mouth) and price incentives on the 1 Hunter and Schellenberg find that Openness-to-Experience-a personality trait measured in psychology that characterizes people who have a general appreciation for art, emotion, adventure, variety of experiences etc.-is correlated with the shape of the function of exposure (linking number of exposures and liking ratings): while low openness leads to an inverted U-shape function, high openness is linked with a decreasing liking rating function according to the number of exposures.
concentration of consumption toward bestsellers. We propose an experiment that simulates an environment where subjects face real choices between different types of musical songs (best selling songs and new artists' productions). We choose to study musical consumption as it is private consumption and it is easy to reproduce in an experimental laboratory. We run this experiment on teenagers because they like music (North, Hargreaves and O'Neill, 2000) , they are prone to the stardom system and they are influenced by peers' opinions (Berns et al., 2010) . We create three treatments, the first being an isolated choice treatment (the Benchmark treatment), a second where subjects receive information about others' evaluation (the Word-of-Mouth treatment) and a third where a real market including prices is established (the Market treatment). Our experimental design has two main advantages: we can precisely measure demand for both categories, and, by comparing treatments, we can isolate the effect of information and pecuniary incentives on the structure of demand in an experiment without search costs.
We find effects of the two treatments on diversity. Regarding the global consumption, we find that the Word-of-Mouth has a negative impact on diversity. Conversely, the Market treatment has a positive impact on diversity since half of the demand is dedicated to bestsellers and the other half to the new artists' songs. We then find that the demand is senstive to the nature of the information and the variability of prices.
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design. Section 3 presents the results, describing the effect of the Word-of-Mouth and the Market treatments on diversity and the reactions of the demand to the nature of the word-of-mouth and the level of prices. Section 4 discusses and concludes.
Experimental design

New Artists versus Bestsellers
To implement new artists' and stars' products, participants face two track categories. On one hand, the "Top 30" category, the bestsellers' category, gathers the 30 French top sell- Both songs belong to the same genre such that we can implement differences in popularity: the Top 30 category represents songs for which teenagers are exposed while the New Artists' category is composed of songs that the participants could like (they are of the same genre and of an expected comparable quality as we chose them according to Noomiz popularity ranking, but they are unknown) 7 .
2 The SNEP (Syndicat National de l'édition Phonographique, French union of the phonographic edition) establishes each week the official chart of the best selling singles in France. It takes into account the physical and the digital sales.
3 A popularity ranking allows them to encounter professionals of the music industry. 4 During our experiment, the subjects were asked : "How do you discover new music?". One of the proposed answer was "By visiting websites like Noomiz that specialize in offering music from new artists". Subjects had to answer on a five-point frequency scale. 54% answered "Never", 22% "Rarely", 13% "From time to time", 5% "Often" and 6% "Very Often".
5 Each category is composed of 24 Anglo-Saxon tracks and 6 French ones. In terms of genres, there are 13 electro/dance/remix's songs, 10 pop/rock/folk and 7 Rap/RnB/Hip-hop/Soul. Songs are classified by genre by both the SNEP and Noomiz.
6 All participant are facing the same set of songs in the same order. 7 Throughout the experiment, the Top 30 is actually better evaluated than the New Artists' category. This corroborates the idea that people prefer what they have already experienced or frequently experienced (Bornstein, 1989) . 
Procedure
The experiment consists of 30 listening periods of 90 seconds each. At each period, participants are asked to choose between two songs, one from each foregoing category, knowing that both songs belong to the same musical genre. The countdown starts and they listen to the chosen song. During the 90 seconds, participants are allowed to switch only once to the other song, the one that was not initially chosen:
• If a subject decides to switch, she is asked to evaluate the song that she just listened to on a five-point-scale illustrated by smileys. Then, at the end of the period, she is asked to evaluate the second song that she listened to (see figure 1 ).
• If a subject decides not to switch, she is only asked to evaluate the only song she listened to at the end of the 90 seconds period. The experiment consists in three distinct treatments. We use a between-subjects design in such way that each participant takes part in only one of the three treatments. The Benchmark Treatment, 2 sessions Subjects (n = 33) are facing the basic procedure described above. This is the control treatment.
The Word-of-Mouth Treatment In the Word-of-mouth treatment (n = 41, 2 sessions), subjects know the mean evaluation of every song which was observed in the Benchmark treatment. It appears as a five-star-scale (with mid-stars). This is to simulate Word-ofMouth information that can theoretically lead to an informational cascade. If one song has no evaluation -simply because no one, in the benchmark market, listened to it -participants are told so.
The Market Treatment In the Market treatment (n = 36, 2 sessions), in each session, two participants are randomly chosen to play the role of sellers, while the others are buyers.
The supply side
Two subjects are randomly designed to sell one category of music to the others in order to implement a monopolistic competition : one seller is to offer songs from the Top 30 category while the other is to offer songs from the New Artists category all along the experiment. At the beginning of the experiment, this situation is described to them. When the experiment starts, each seller is assigned to one of the two categories and will only sell this specific category during the whole session (Top 30 or New Artists). At each period, the sellers listen to one song of the genre they will have to sell and set a per second price included in a defined range 8 .
There overall profit of the seller who sells category j is computed as follows:
where j is the song's category and τ is the amount of seconds allocated by buyer i to category j at time t. The seller who makes the highest profit wins a 30 grammes candies' bag. Figure (2) represents the Market sessions and the prices that are set by the sellers. Not surprisingly, we can see that for both sessions the Top 30 price is almost always higher than the New Artists' price such that there are incentives to consume the New Artists' category.
We can also see that there is a convergence in prices throughout rounds.
The demand side
Besides the two selected sellers, all the other participants from each session are music buyers. At each period, they are offered one song of each category j at a price p j . They also have a per period budget of 1800 ECU that diminishes according to the song -and the budget is to be saved 9 , such that his/her overall saving is:
At the end of the experiment, S i is converted into candies in weight 10 . It is important that the buyers can save experimental currency in order to control for income allocation and preference for saving.
Sample comparison
10 The conversion rate is 2gr. of candies for 1000ECU. The participants were high-school students who were participating in an open day organized by the University of Paris 1. Several high-schools were invited to participate in order to introduce research in economics to the students. Besides the conferences, one of the main activity of this event was to take part in our experiment. Groups were allocated randomly to the three treatments. Nevertheless, the three Academies were not present on the same day in such way that each session was composed of students from the same Academy 12 . The fact that participants are not coming from the same Academy can explain the difference in musical listening habits. These differences can also be due to the fact that we are using a relatively small sample. However, we control afterwards for musical tastes and it does not change our results.
Results
Descriptive results
First, we study the impact of information and incentives on the overall consumption distribution. In Figure 3 , we can see that the average demand is skewed toward the Top 30 category for the Benchmark treatment and the Word-of-Mouth treatment while it is almost equally distributed in the Market treatment.
The Word-of-Mouth treatment has a negative impact on the demand for novelty: while subjects listen to 36 seconds (40%) of the New Artists' category on average in the Benchmark treatment, they only listen to 30 (33%) seconds of it in the WoM treatment (a Mann-Whitney test yields p<0.001). On average, the Top 30 category was better rated than the New Artists' category along the experiment except for only one period. Hence, the average consumption in the Benchmark and the Word-of-Mouth treatments might reflect the quality difference between the two categories.
11 ns means that all the two-sample t-tests are non significant. Only significant ttests' p-values are reported. 12 A table describing the distribution of participants by treatment can be found in the Appendix. 
Estimation
To confirm these descriptive results, we run an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis, clustered on individuals (see Table 2 ). The first column (1) only contains two dummies as explanatory variables corresponding to the Word-of-Mouth and the Market treatment. The dependent variable is the time spent listening to the New Artists' category (in seconds) 13 and the OLS regression enhances the effect of the Word-of-Mouth treatment and the Market treatment. In Column (2), we add variables as controls. While the first treatment has a significant negative impact, lowering the expected time dedicated to New Artists (-5.4 seconds), the second has a significantly positive impact, raising the expected consumption (+14 seconds). There is also a significant effect of the beginning of the experiment such that the expected value of the time spent on the New Artists' category is about 6 seconds higher during the first 15 rounds. It seems that there is an exploratory period where subjects wish to try more of the New Artists' category. While all the control variables for listening habits do not yield any significant effect, the exposure to mainstream radio channels 14 , that generally broadcast the Top 30 songs, has, without surprise, a negative impact on the expected time dedicated to the New Artists' category. All things being equal, choosing the New Artists' song first has an important positive impact on the expected listening time (+17.5 seconds).
It might be the case that subjects need time to evaluate and experience the first song they chose to listen such that an anchor effect might appear. Finally, the quality difference, which is the difference between the overall mean evaluation of the Top 30 and the New Artists songs per period 15 , negatively impacts the time spent on New Artists (-2.2 seconds). By controlling for the quality difference between both songs, we are able to isolate the pure signal effect of the Word-of-Mouth treatment.
14 Mainstream exposure is a continuous variable on a five points scale that combines answers, on a fivepoint Likert scale each, to the following questions: "how often do you listen to the following radio channels?:"
• Ado FM These French radio channels are broadcasting mainstream music and top charts.
15 Here, the average evaluations used for the quality difference measure is to be distinguished with the average evaluation used in the Word-of-Mouth treatment. In the first case, it is measured by the overall sample's evaluations while in the second case, the average evaluation is calculated only with the subjects' evaluations of the Benchmark treatment. Note: WoM and Market are two dummy variables equal to 1 if subjects are respectively in the Word-ofMouth or Market treatments, 0 otherwise. Maintstream radio is a continuous variable on a 4 points basis. New Artists first is a dummy variable equal to 1 if subject chooses to listen to the novelty song first. Quality difference if a continuous variable. round_1_15 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the first fifteen rounds, 0 otherwise. Female is a dummy variable equal to 1 for female subjects and age is a continuous variable.
Demand curves, information and incentives
In the previous section, we found effects of both treatments on the time spent on New Artists.
We now look closer to the reaction of the demand to information and incentives.
The scatter diagrams shown in Figure 
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper attempts to replicate choice treatments where demand meets two types of music products: superstars and new artists' productions. A first result of the experiment remains consistent with the existing literature and shows that others' opinion strengthen the stardom effect as the demand concentrates more on the Top 30 category. Indeed, there can be two origins of this phenomenon: either people rely on others' opinions to make the best choice (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992, Banerjee, 1992) , or people benefit from coordinating with others thanks to community sharing (Adler, 1985) . In the two cases, there is a tendency to imitate others' behavior and to consider others' opinions. With information, popular products tend to be more popular. In our experiment, the word-of-mouth is almost always in favor of the Top 30 category to the detriment of the new artist's demand.
Moreover, subjects react to the nature of the information: the better the evaluation of the Top 30 category regarding the New Artists' category, the higher the share of time dedicated to it.
Our experiment also shows that, when replicating a music market with prices, the aggregate demand is more diversified. We found that with incentives in favor of the New Artists' category, the demand structure change toward more diversity. This goes against Adler's theory supposing that new artists cannot entice the demand even with a lower price. Indeed, in our experiment where there are no search cost nor discussion with others, participants only know what songs are produced by popular artists. According to Adler, popular artists are "artists that everybody are familiar with" and popularity constitutes an entry barrier to the market. Thus, one could expect that because of popularity, participants would not be that sensitive to price. However, our experiment shows that it is not necessarily the case when there is only the price and information on popularity (which is of course never the case in the real world).
The price sensitivity between popular songs and new artists' songs is an important result because it is not easy to highlight with field data. Indeed, in the digital and the physical music markets, prices are uniform (Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2003) . In the concert market, prices are differentiated but difficulties can be encountered when analyzing the relation between prices and demand. Indeed, some determining data can be unavailable: the prices of resale tickets, some characteristics of the concert hall like the geographic distance from consumers etc. Moreover, with an experiment, we can really isolate the effect of prices from the effect of word-of-mouth.
One other important result is that, in an isolated treatment, new artists entice 40% of the demand. This result is not easy to stress in the real industry because there are exogenous variables that determine demand. It is even more surprising that teenagers are usually important consumers of the Top 30. This result lets us think that there are novelty-seeking behaviors and that people actually seek out new musical productions.
From these results, we can infer public policy recommendations. It remains difficult to control evaluation of songs on digital platforms but it is possible to subsidize consumption of new artists' songs. These subsidies can have real incentives to promote diversity.
Of course, this experiment was conducted on a very specific population: teenagers. It would be interesting to see if we can replicate these results with adults that may not behave the same when facing information or incentives. What would also be interesting in such a framework is to measure more precisely the level of satisfaction. The level of arousal and pleasure are variables that can be measured to approximate satisfaction (Bradley and Lang, 1994) , beside the self-declared satisfaction. This way, we could compare the impact of information and incentives on satisfaction and see if diversity alters or improves general well-being. Indeed, it is not sure that introduction of differential prices do not alter overall well-being.
In this article, we show that using experimental methods, we can study the stardom effect and cultural diffusion. These methods appear to be really useful when data are difficult to gather or analyze. Moreover, even if we used the music market in our experiment for con- Before and after the experiment, you will be asked to fill in a questionnaire with honesty.
All the answers will remain anonymous.
The experiment During the experiment, you will listen to songs sorted in two categories:
• The "Top 30" category: These are the 30 bestselling songs of the beginning of November (it can be physical sells, such as CDs bought in any music stores, or digital sells like songs sold on the web).
• The category "New artist": these are 30 songs from artists who are not on the musical market yet.
Both of the categories are composed of the following musical genres: pop, rock, rap, rn'b, electro and dance.
The experiment contains 30 steps of listening time.
• For each step you have 90 seconds during which you can listen to music. You will be able to see the elapsed time and the remaining time on your scree.
• At the beginning of each step, and before listening to music, two songs will appear on the screen:
-One will be from the Top 30 category -The other one will be from the New artist category (that you probably do not know).
-Both of the songs that appear together on the screen belong to the same musical genre.
For instance, during one step, you can choose between two rap songs (one belongs to the "Top 30" and the other to the "New artist category, or two pop songs, or two electro songs etc.).
-From one step to another, the songs are different, but you will always know that among the two songs that are proposed to you at a given step, one belongs to the "Top 30" category and the other to the "New artist" category.
-For each song, there is an evaluation on a five stars scale (it will appear next to each corresponding songs). The ratings are based on the songs' evaluations from your schoolmates, this morning.
If there is no star, it means that no one evaluated this song hence nobody listened to it. The worst rating is half a star, the best one is five stars. There can be half stars.
-You will then choose one of the two songs in order to start listening to it.
-At any time, you can decide to switch to the other song. You will then be able to listen to the other song until the end of the 90 seconds.
WARNING: You can only switch one time: once you decide to switch, you cannot switch back again.
-If you decide to switch, and when switching to the other song, we will ask you to evaluate the song you just listened to with smileys that will appear on your screen (the happier the smiley is, the more you liked the song you just listened to).
When evaluating the song, music and time count stop. Music listening starts again once you validated your evaluation. At the end of the step, you will be asked to evaluate the second song you listened to with smileys.
If during the whole step, you decide not to switch and to listen to the same song during 90 seconds, then, at the end of the step, you will only have to evaluate the song you chose, with smileys.
These are illustrations of one step: 
